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  • #167066
    Robert
    Participant

    With respect to the training of German tank crews, the first Abteilung of A7Vs arrived in Sturmbataillon Rohr’s training area on January 26th 1918. From Hundleby and Strasheim:

    “The men of ATD 1 [Assault Tank Detachment] were taught to form assault parties, to use their gas masks safely under all imaginable conditions, to clear trenches with hand grenades, to operate captured enemy machine guns, and to handle captured enemy hand grenades. The engineers and pioneers amongst the crews learned to employ flame-throwers in order to roll up enemy strongholds. The gunners had spent some… days with the howitzer battery of ABn 5 [Assault Battalion – ie Sturmbataillon Nr. 5].”

    The same source quotes from the history of Infanterie Regiment Nr. 128, which accompanied Abteilung 1 into action near St Quentin on March 21st, 1918 – the first day of Operation Michael:

    “The crews of the two tanks [501 and 506] had successfully enfiladed the enemy with shells and a torrent of bullets. Several trenches were thus rolled up. In some cases, details of the crews even dismounted and attacked strongholds with hand grenades, and flame-throwers.”

    The authors then added the following note:

    “Being a female A7V [at that time], tank 501 carried two small flame-throwers, called ‘Kleifs’ – ‘Kleine Flammenwerfer’.”

    On April 24th during the attack on Villers-Brettoneux:

    “Generally speaking, tidying up Villers-Brettoneux caused few problems, although in some actions it was necessary for crews to dismount. The armament of the tanks was designed for direct fire but fighting in urban areas and against fortified enemy positions requires a great deal of indirect fire to reach behind the enemy’s cover. This can be provided by howitzers, mortars or hand grenades. Therefore, to bring the enemy out from behind his cover, an A7V would approach and pin the defenders down with a barrage of machine gun bullets and shells, while at the same time an assault party would dismount from the other side of the tank and quickly attack the enemy with hand grenades.”

    “Before Theunissen’s vehicle, tank 506 Mephisto, could reach the fortified farmyard it was disabled by jammed injectors. While his mechanics worked to repair the damage, Theunissen and most of his men dismounted and fought on as an assault party.”

    When Elfriede overturned in a sand pit during the same battle, twenty-two men debussed from the tank “…armed with machine guns, rifles, and hand grenades”. Leutnant Stein was killed and one crew member was captured but the remainder were able to disengage and move back, carrying Stein’s body with them.

    Robert

    #167069
    Robert
    Participant

    The true Sturmbataillon men had a very different training from the ordinary assault troops, including the German ones. Not every man with handgrenades and kinfe / spade, going out of the trenches for raids, was a Sturmtrupper.

    Yes, broadly-speaking Sturmtruppen can be categorised in three groups:

    1. The highly-trained super-specialists in assault tactics. Sturmbataillon Nr. 5 was the most well known, thanks to the promotional activities of its second commander, Willy Rohr, and the royal patronage of Kronprinz Willhelm. Other examples were formed at Army command level, such as Sturmbataillon Nr. 7 in VII Army. These units had very significant numbers of integrated support weapons, such as LMGs and MMGs, Flammenwerfer, Minenwerfer, and infantry guns. Furthermore, they would be supported by much more artillery than was usually the case.

    Several independent Flammenwerfer units fell into this category of super-specialists too.

    2. At lower levels of command, division- down to company-levels, specialist assault companies, platoons, or sections were formed respectively. The men of these units were often trained by the super-specialists but they lacked the same levels of integrated support weapons. These units were very dependent on the enthusiasm and support of their respective commanders, which was key to determining how much extra artillery support would be assigned during missions for example.

    The lower-level specialists were often supported during a specific mission by the likes of independent Flammenwerfer units. When this happened, the Flammenwerfer unit commander would ensure that the appropriate artillery support was provided. Even a junior Flammenwerfer leader could call off an action if he felt that insufficient supporting fire was available.

    3. Standard infantry who were trained in assault tactics by specialists or super-specialists. Ludwig Renn wrote about this in his book ‘Krieg‘, which was translated into English as ‘War’. The main character was trained by a super-specialist unit before Operation Michael and returned to his unit wearing the leather patches over the knees and elbows on his uniform.

    ‘”Service in a storm battalion” said Lamm [in late 1917], “will suit you better than sticking in the trenches.” I didn’t quite see through that. Of course, I had not the vaguest idea of what a storm battalion was. “What is a storm battalion, actually, sir?”
    “I don’t quite know myself. I only know that we’re to be trained as patrol and shock-troop leaders.”

    We had to drag machine guns and fling bombs, advance along trenches and crawl without a sound. At first that was a severe strain on me.
    I sweated on every occasion… Then daily it grew easier. We were on duty from morning till night, with only two or three hours of an interval at midday. I had no time for reflection and felt in good trim.’

    On returning to his unit, Renn mentions the arrival of a new company commander:

    “He’s from Divisional Staff. An order has been issued that officers from the higher staffs have to take turns serving at the front.”
    “What does he look like?”
    “He has a monocle and a riding-switch.”
    “Just what you would expect from the base.”

    The new commander reviews the company:

    “Sergeant Renn, you are wearing puttees and leather knee-pieces. Is that allowed in the regiment, sergeant-major?”
    “He came back from a storm battalion only two days ago, sir.”
    “That’s excellent. We’ll get together a whole platoon of shock-troops. But as far as I can see, the whole company is arranged in a higgledy-piggledy manner, old and young together, and giants beside dwarfs. Has nobody tried to alter that?”

    The new commander ‘was looking for something to find fault with, but did not know enough about it… “Agree with him and do as you like,” laughed the subaltern.’

    #167071
    Robert
    Participant

    The Sturmbat. was trained to ignore the strongpoints and go deep into the defence line. Close coordination with artillery and with much firepower. And only used in the big offensives, not daily work.

    invisible officer, I agree with your point that the super-specialist assault battalions were not used for low-level raids and the like.

    I respectfully disagree about their being trained to ignore strongpoints and penetrate as far as possible into the enemy lines. Given the need for close coordination with artillery and for as much firepower support as possible, these units were usually given precise locations to assault – usually the hardest to overcome, precisely because these units were best suited to the job. During Operation Michael, the units within Sturmbataillon Nr. 5 were parcelled out. Two companies were assigned to support A7V Abteilung 1 near St Quentin. The orders for the attack were to assault Urvillers in the first instance, so that other infantry units could go forward beyond it.

    Here is another example from Sturmbataillon Nr. 7, from Operation Freidensturm. One Sturmblock, comprising about 60 men with light Minenwerfer, light and heavy machine guns, and Granatenwerfer, from the battalion accompanied an infantry regiment from 38th Infantry Division. The following translation is mine:

    “Sturmblock Gößler (1) was assigned to the 5th Grenadier Regiment…, which was part of General von Kathen’s
    right Attack Group (Angriffsgruppe). After crossing the Marne, the unit… was responsible for the task of clearing the enemy from the villages of Moulin, Paroy and Connigis on the east-facing slopes of the Surmelin Valley, so that the attack infantry could quickly advance further, unhindered.”

    The use of clear and specific objectives meant that close artillery support could be provided. In the case of Sturmblock Gößler, the unit failed because French artillery counter-preparatory fire interdicted the attempts to cross the river:

    “They were so smashed about on the northern slope of the Marne by the enemy artillery fire that all the storm troopers’ support weapons were destroyed; 15 men were killed and 18 wounded from the Sturmbattalion before they had even reached the enemy. Also their courageous leader, Leutnant Gössler, was wounded, first in the right hand, then mortally via the right shoulder joint into the right chest. Nevertheless, despite being badly knocked about, they tried. The infantry Grenadiers from Danzig, along with the small remnant of the Sturmblock tried to cross the Marne several times. But in vain! Numerous aircraft added to the wall of shrapnel from the enemy shells by dropping bombs and strafing the area with machine-gun fire. Spent and exhausted, their leaders killed, the attack column completely broke down in the hostile fire, since the pioneers could not get to the enemy bank despite their strongest efforts. The Sturmblock, which had little combat capability after loosing all its support weapons, was withdrawn and played no further part.”

    This quote is important because it reinforces the importance of the integral support weapons, as you rightly pointed out previously.

    #167072
    invisible officer
    Participant

    Hundleby and Strasheim is one of the books that are ……

    The A7V crew training. It was for days, not the weeks needed to basic train assault tropps. For true Sturm Units it was months.
    What ATD 1? 501 belonged to Sturm-Panzer-Kraftwagen-Abteilung Nr. 1 . To translate something into Fantasy abrevations is typical for bad English books like that.

    “The engineers and pioneers amongst the crews learned to employ flame-throwers in order to roll up enemy strongholds” Typical English wording, the German army had Pioniere but no Engineers in British style. Do they think about the mechanics? I doubt that the tanks two Verkehrstruppen mechanics got trained for flamethrower attacks. The only men that knew how to keep the A7V running.

    Training with enemy MG and grenades was basic for front soldiers in WW I. Nothing like “assault troop” Training.

    The only true part of that is about the gas masks. Most of the crewman had never used them. They needed basic Training to survive at the front.

    The A7V Crews disliked the idea of using flamethrowers. Not just as additional risk in tank. Everybody captured with one had a high probability to end with a bullet in head or bayonet in back. For that reason flamethroer men of all armies tended to cut away the special badges.

    The only men that could be spared for service out of tank are the No. 2 MG gunners. Reducing the tanks MG irepower a bit but possible. So 6 men with two kleifs and the LMG…..

    The Kleifs had been on the list and so they ended in some books. The Tagebuch of Abteilung 1 mentions no dismounted fight of the five crews at St. Quentin, only 510 and 506 fighting. (One other did not move at all and two stranded shortly post start)

    The Wex had just three bursts.

    I can only repeat, the Tagebücher of the Sturm-Panzer-Kraftwagen-Abteilungen mention not a single flamethrower use! And the contemporary authors should have known.

    By the way, the same Rainer Strasheim wrote in a later work , “Deutsche Kampfwagen im 1. Weltkrieg. Der A7V und die Anfänge deutscher Panzerentwicklung on p. 15, exactly that. “Flammenwerfer wurden – obwohl im Ausstattungssoll vorgesehen – nicht eingesetzt”.

    The dismounted fights mentioned in the unit Tagebücher are normally those done by men from disabled tanks. Not for bravery but to get away from the big target. They had order to take cover in trenches or shell holes around the tank to defend it until recovery. For that they ad to disable possible enemies in dugouts.

    Hand grenade attacks by Crews are rare and mentioned as special, ever asking for EK I, II or other rewards.

    #167087
    Robert
    Participant

    This quote is important because it reinforces the importance of the integral support weapons, as you rightly pointed out previously.

    My original point, which was not clear enough (apologies), is the even super-specialist German stormtroopers were not super-human – capable of gliding between strongpoints with ease, etc. This is another of those half-myths, fostered in part by pre-WW2 propaganda, etc. These men were tough and well-trained but, like their British and French counterparts, needed adequate support from a range of weapon systems to do well. Hence my comment that, from a rules perspective, they don’t need a special unique-to-German-Stormtroopers rule/s.

    #167088
    Robert
    Participant

    A lot of work put into that Sturmtruppen man. Nice one.

    Thank you very much for the feedback, invisible officer. It took some effort, as you rightly figured. The steel helmet was 3D printed. I have a WW1 Brodie helmet ready to print as well. Plus 3D models of the MG08/15, hand grenades, WW1 German gas mask containers and a variety of other items. These make conversions a lot easier.

    Most of the other WW1 figures are larger – 28 vs 25mm. I prefer the latter. Woodbine figures are a good match for Warlord Games figure conversions.

    Robert

    #167191
    invisible officer
    Participant

    Yes, the many scales of miniatures…… I have WW I land in big 28 mm, older small 28 mm and 1/300 (for the big units, 1/10 ratio regiments)

    I prefer the big ones, esp. because there are more “specials” available. My 42 cm Dicke Bertha or the Schlanke Emma make a great raid objective. 😉

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    #167192
    invisible officer
    Participant

    Hi Robert,
    yes, the Sturmbataillon men had high losses, no immortal war gods. Without the new artillery tactic they would not have been able to penetrate into the enemies lines.

    One should not forget the desperate material situation of the “Mittelmächte”. Everything was in short supply, in 1915 Germany even lacked the leather for the spiked helmets. So they made replacements from felt and other materials. The Austrian army situation was even worse.

    Cartridge brass was short, so they tried iron. Good in rifle but not for MG.

    A typical mistake for German Soldiers is to show them ever with Stielhandgranate. (the Potato masher) In fact the Kugel- and Eierhandgranate was as common. The Stielhandgranate had a thin head and worked mainly by blast. The others, like the Mills, had thicker walls and produced heavy splinters. For clearing a dugout the blast was better. But the “Egg” could be thrown on a bigger distance and was preferred in defense.

    The differing numbers of MP 18 in literature are caused by the peace treaty. It was one of the few arms named. The Reichswehr was not allowed any SMG. But police was.
    So the German army gave a low number of MP 18 as made. Stating around 10.000 being in use. Clever wording made many readers think that that was the number produced. In fact it was based on weapons surviving in army hands at armistice. So the thousands lost are not counted. And all those in factories and depots are just forgotten. The MP 18 used in China are not all made there, some ship loads came from the factory via Scandinavia post war.

    The official ones for police got a stamp 1920 and conversions for another magazine. A few hundreds that did not worry the allies. But thousands went into hiding. And the Freikorps got many.

    For winter18/19 the plan was to have a MP 18 for each officer, NCO and 10 % of the OR. The production allowed that.

    (An enormous number of arms went into hiding. The Pour le Merite bomber Geschwader leader Leonhardy hid even Gothas in barns. The Allied search commission found some arms, mostly those they should)

    #167325
    Robert
    Participant

    Rainer Strasheim wrote in a later work , “Deutsche Kampfwagen im 1. Weltkrieg. Der A7V und die Anfänge deutscher Panzerentwicklung on p. 15, exactly that. “Flammenwerfer wurden – obwohl im Ausstattungssoll vorgesehen – nicht eingesetzt”.

    Strasheim’s “Deutsche Kampfwagen im 1. Weltkrieg” was first published in 1988. There were at least two reprints produced subsequently. “The German A7V Tank And Captured British Mark IV Tanks of World War I” was published in 1990, with Hundleby listed as the first author. The information about Flammenwerfer and dismounted assault tactics post-date Strasheim’s earlier quote.

    Hundleby and Strasheim followed up with “Sturmpanzer A7V; First of the Panzers” in 2010; with this book, Strasheim is listed as first author.

    “Sturmpanzer A7V” was published primarily because of the fantastic, hitherto unseen photos of A7Vs and variants from the Jochen Vollert Collection. Strasheim used the opportunity to provide further updates on the issues that we have been discussing. There is no further information on Flammenwerfer. It is noted that Abteilung 1. ‘…had the luck of remaining with [Sturmbataillon Rohr] until their first combat mission on 21 March 1918. They therefore received much more intensive training than any other German tank unit. This made them the most efficient and combat-ready detachment of all.”

    In the section on ‘Technology and Combat’, the following comments are made:

    “Each tank was supposed to carry into combat at least one box of 20 hand grenades… Crews – at least those of Abteilung 1. – were trained to leave the tank in order to throw hand grenades on the enemy not accessible to the cannon and machine guns in urban terrain or in trench combat.”

    “Each crew member was armed with a pistol and trench dagger. For arming an assault squad, each A7V tank carried one 08/15 light machine gun and four type 98 carbines.

    However, the exercise of forming assault squads when a tank got stuck was discontinued in late spring of 1918. Experience proved that the casualties suffered stood in no relation to the marginal support they could provide to the attacking infantry. Crews now formed strongpoints close to their vehicles and waited for repair or salvage.”

    It should be noted that British and French tank crews would often dismount machine guns from disabled tanks and form MG teams, either light- or medium MG teams depending on the weapons.

    Robert

    #167326
    invisible officer
    Participant

    Yes, his later works ommit the Flammenwerfer apart from the lists.
    There was a discussion in Gesellschaft für Heereskunde for some time, the search in the Tagebücher ended it. No use mentioned.
    It also showed that the training by Rohr was superficial. The Verkehrstruppen guys lacked even basic knowledge.

    (Like no smoker me. 😉 I was trained by Berlin fire service for a week to be in Museum “the boy” for fire and rescue. That made me hardly able to light a cigaret and add a plaster)

    The pistol was standard for all that could not use a cumbersome K 98. The trench knife was worn by most in the trenches, mainly to cut apples.

    It took some time to mount and dismount the A7V 08 mg. The British tank was much better designed in that regard.

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