Attack columns question

[HobbitMiles]

Yes, excellent link by the way.

As I said before, I've only played Napoleonics with BP once, and by coincidence that was earlier this week. I think that by pure chance we managed to replicate historical tactics. I had 4 French battalions, a battery and a squadron of hussars, my opponent effectively the same force but of Prussians. I initially deployed in attack column but left sufficient space to deploy into line if I needed to - I had every intention of doing this. In essence three of my battalions faced off three of his, but because he got some good movement dice I was still in column while he was in line. The main difference was that he was getting 3 shooting dice to my one while I closed the remaining distance, by the time I was able to deliver charges most of my units had become shaken by the closing fire and as we were then evenly matched the melee was one unit on one and most of my units then recoiled. The deciding factor in the battle was that I was able to bring my gun to bear at close range and eventually destroyed one Prussian battalion thus opening up a flank. Now, the point of this is not to give you an very uninspiring AAR, but to show that my columns only worked with support from a gun.

My next question would be: was your scenario balanced? Why were the French able to bring two columns to bear against each one that the British had? Were the British outmaneouvred, outnumbered or outthought?

[Rod MacArthur]

So, if it never happened, or if French Attack Columns always formed into line before they went into contact, why do you (anyone, not just Rod) think that most, if not all, wargames rules allow it? Is it just that they are all written by people who haven't done their research properly? Is it because they are following the wrong research? Or is it (Devil's Advocate here ) just that people don't like it when it happens in games and say that it didn't and shouldn't happen because it becomes too powerful a tactic to overcome and as they don't know how to combat it, they just say that it is notwhat happened without any real proof?

Well there is no doubt that Guibert's 1770s tactical thinking was that columns were for fast movement on the battlefield but should form line before combat. Both the French 1791 and British Napoleonic 1792 tactical manuals follow that principle. The British stuck with it during the Napoleonic wars, but the French did not, and often attacked whilst still in column. The reasons the French did so are complex, and probably involve a mixture of having relatively untrained troops during the Republican era, who would have had a problem in converting to line, wanting to attack rapidly (which was successful against some unsteady enemies) and sometimes misjudging the point at which to convert from column to line (particularly against the British using reverse slope tactics).

The issue is not whether the French sometimes (perhaps more often than not) attacked in column but whether such columns maintained deploying distance around them (ie were not bunched up so they would be unable to deploy. It would be interesting to see any contemporary source showing two or more French columns in such a close proximity to each other.

I am afraid I do think that many authors of wargame rules have not read the contemporary drill manuals or researched actual tactics from contemporary accounts, but merely copy others ideas, from which such errors become entrenched. I actually have all the drill manuals of the major combatents of the era (my British ones are mostly expensive originals) and a large library of memoirs which I have extensively analysed to find "tactical snippets) to cross reference actual practice with regulations. I did this for a book on tactics I began to write over 15 years ago, and which one day I must finish.

Rod

[Cubster]

So, if it never happened, or if French Attack Columns always formed into line before they went into contact, why do you (anyone, not just Rod) think that most, if not all, wargames rules allow it?

The reasons the French did so are complex, and probably involve a mixture of having relatively untrained troops during the Republican era, who would have had a problem in converting to line, wanting to attack rapidly (which was successful against some unsteady enemies) and sometimes misjudging the point at which to convert from column to line (particularly against the British using reverse slope tactics).

Just wanted to horn in here and claim half a point by riding on the back of Rod's superior explanation. From what I've read it seems that, as Rod says, the manuals didn't advocate the column as a formation for closing to HTH with an enemy unit, rather it was a method to bring the troops quickly and cohesively to a point where they could redeploy into line.

However, many commanders found, when facing slightly shaky opposition, that the mere sight of a column getting close was enough to make the enemy waver and begin to break. It was thus sometimes adapted on campaign to a bludgeon that would keep ploughing onwards and so long as it maintained its momentum and the enemy was sufficiently unnnerved, it was a pretty effective use of relatively low grade conscripts to break a defensive position.

The problems came when the enemy didn't break, had artillery support and/or kept their discipline. Then it was the column that wavered and broke under a hail of lead.

Rod's mention of the reverse slope tactics is important because if you can't see where the defending line is, there is no way for the attacking commander to accurately judge where to redeploy into line. With effective skirmisher clouds, British infantry in the Peninsular were able to blind the columns and entice them into marching towards apparently empty ground. By the time they saw a line of muskets pointed at them it was too late to try to redeploy into a formation that was less of a sitting duck. You can imagine the butchery of a static milling mass of men trying to change from column to line . At 100 yards a musket may not be accurate, but it hardly needed to be if hundreds of lead balls were flying towards a solid mass of flesh.

It's a simplification of course, but a useful model that helped me get a grip on the basics.

[Greenjacket]

Have a look at http://www.napoleon-series.org/military ... maida.html

French tactics at a brigade level should be that the brigade manoeuvres in columns in "proper array" - that is to say, wide intervals between the battalion columns to allow passage of the lines, units to wheel, and deployment of the battalions when they neared the enemy. When close to the enemy, the forward units deployed into a "ligne de feu", while other units remained in column in a "ligne de choc".

In Blackpowder, what a good French player should do is rely on his excellent Command 9 Brigadier and his battalions in attack column (+2 Command) to get three moves. The brigade is arrayed in a chequerboard of attack columns. In the first two moves the brigade moves forwards 24" right into close range of the enemy line. In the third move the leading units deploy into line. Then, in the Shooting phase of the turn, the French units deliver a volley at close range into the defenders.

Unfortunately, in Blackpowder, the rules also allow a player to adopt a ridiculous "phalanx" of attack columns that get some big advantages. I really hope that the Napoelonics supplement deals with this absurdity.

[Comte Michel]

Taking up a number of points from the above, I think it's also a mistake to take infantry tactics in isolation. Of course there were pure infantry slugging matches, the fleches at Borodino for instance, but the most successful commanders were those that could master 'all arms' tactics. Just like Ney didn't at Waterloo... Force the opponent into square with a cavalry threat, reducing his firepower, then smash him with close range artillery or musketry. Manoevre a unit or battery onto his flank and demoralise him. Even an elite unit like the Guard at Waterloo could be shattered by such tactics, especially if handled badly in the first place.

Coupled with their mastery of grand tactics this is a major reason why the French had so much success against continental European armies. The Austrians, Russians and Prussians, at least early on, had no commanders capable of using troops in this manner and suffered accordingly until they learnt from observation and began to replicate French tactics.

Under these circumstances the column could be effective without deployment into line, but only against already wavering opponents. Against steady British lines it was much less so. However this was not the result of a French doctrine to remain in column. Quite the reverse in fact - the drill books specified that they should deploy into before closing. But in the Peninsula on a number of occasions the French columns were caught before or during deployment into line and suffered horribly as a result. Wellington's reverse slope tactics were a contributing factor in several cases.

But really the issue here isn't whether we should permit or force deployment into line from column. It's more one of changing people's attitudes to historical wargaming, to the extent that people feel obliged to use historically correct formations at the brigade and divisional level, rather than inventing their own deployments to maximise the numbers under the rules.

[Greenjacket]

The issue is not whether the French sometimes (perhaps more often than not) attacked in column but whether such columns maintained deploying distance around them (ie were not bunched up so they would be unable to deploy. It would be interesting to see any contemporary source showing two or more French columns in such a close proximity to each other.

Two examples spring to mind: Albuera and D'Erlon's Corps at Waterloo.
Of course, it is significant that the French attributed their defeat in both cases to the fact that the units were unable to deploy due they became entangled, and that the cunning British launched an attack at the very time that the French were trying to sort themselves out!

Thinking about it, it seems to me that columns beginning a turn without space to deploy are disordered.

Cheers

Paul

[zedeyejoe]

Unfortunately, in Blackpowder, the rules also allow a player to adopt a ridiculous "phalanx" of attack columns that get some big advantages. I really hope that the Napoelonics supplement deals with this absurdity.

I thought that the idea was that we sort it out for ourselves.

[Rod MacArthur]

But really the issue here isn't whether we should permit or force deployment into line from column. It's more one of changing people's attitudes to historical wargaming, to the extent that people feel obliged to use historically correct formations at the brigade and divisional level, rather than inventing their own deployments to maximise the numbers under the rules.

Personally, I would prefer to see rules which permit historically incorrect tactics, but then impose historically correct penalties for using them. That way people learn the hard way that their model soldiers should not use such wrong tactics. Two such areas are particular "hobby-horses" of mine, columns massing together without leaving deployment distance between them, as discussed in this thread, and cavalry operating by complete massed regiments, and not the historically correct system of semi-autonomous squadrons, with gaps of at least one third of a squadron between them. I would personally vote for a disorder rule to apply in both circumstances, but exactly how that would fit with disorder being removed at the end of the player's turn in Black Powder, I am at a loss to resolve.

Writing rules which are both historically accurate and playable is a problem which wargames designers have wrestled with for many years.

Rod

[HobbitMiles]

I was going to jump in and agree wholeheartedly with Rod that people need a good grasp of period tactics and the only way to achieve that is to look at original drill manuals and good contemporary acounts of actions from people who understood what they were seeing. Modern histories too often perpetuate misconceptions through lazy research. I've always gone for looking at original material and whilst I don't have Rod's deep pockets to buy them outright it is often possible to obtain relatively cheap modern reprints or originals may be available to view at your local regimental museum - just try asking, you may be amazed at what they have.

The rules/suppliment writer then needs to try to convey this to their reader - the truth is that the vast bulk of readers/gamers will never undertake such a level of serious research and will have their opinions formed by what is possible in a game. To quote one of my regular opponents "yeah but this has nothing to do with reality, it is just as much a fantasy as Warhammer", well, one can only hope to appeal to the better nature of such people through patience, kind words and a lump hammer.

BP trys to avoid being a prescriptive game (i.e. you must do xyz) and instead is very deliberately a permissive game (i.e. we like to do xyz when playing [i]our[i]games). I suspect that if you're waiting for someone on the BP team to had down a stone tablet forbidding something then you may have a very long wait.

I think that an awful lot comes down to who you play with and how you choose to play the game - so the absurdity is on the part of the players, not the rules. Remember that BP is a fairly generic set for a 200 year period, what it does allow is for individuals to tailor their games to their style of play. I think the key is to try to persuade your players to play historically rather than to force them to play that way. Perhaps the solution to that is to design historical scenarios and umpire them offering kind words of advice to both sides and awarding a prize (in the form of a small chocolate coin) to the most historically appropriate player of the evening.

[Sarmaticus]

A fairly easy modification would be to allow units to melee each of their opponents with all of their attack dice:
Hits don't equal casualties, they register the general damage to the unit.
In a melee or close combat it's the relative damage in that combat that's important - are we winning or losing?
The rule change would encourage an economy of force: Two columns ganging up on one would have a better chance of breaking the unit but at the cost of taking damage/wearing out two of their own.