modern weapons

[HobbitMiles]

First of all I'd like to say that I've been involved in a couple of discussions on these forums that seem to have gotten a little hot - I sincerely hope this isn't going to be another one and I think we should all have a big group hug before we go on any further.



Right, my comment about one-to-one fighting is based on what I've read of the NW Frontier (quite a lot of original accounts) and bits and bobs about the Sudan. On the NW Frontier the Pathans almost never stood to receive a charge, and if they did they would basically loose. They did launch charges, but these were almost always cut down by British fire. There are a number of occassions where small parties of British are cut off and cut up. From what I know of the Sudan again, in general, where the tribesmen did get into contact they were repulsed by superior discipline etc.etc. This may be herasy, but I know little about the AZW.

I think one needs to be very careful about bringing in game mechanics that are designed to emphasise one sides' abilities too much. Throughout history victories are often brought about by the application of appropriate tactics to a specific set of circumstances, or the opponents' failure to use appropriate tactics or a combination of both. Isn't it more satisfying to win because of superior tactics or spoting and exploiting a weakness than simply because you have loads more dice than the enemy?

Building in abilities that are too extreme takes away much of the fun of the game. The basic "6" for H-T-H appears to be given to trained, competant and suitably equipped men. There are loads of special rules that can be applied to H-T-H such as Bloodthirsty and Ferocious Charge to bump up a value, but looking at the BP core rules and LAOK the core value of 6 rarely moves by more than +/- 1 unless we're looking at cavalry.

So, at Isandlwana, for example, one reading in game terms could be the British player has deployed his line out in skirmish order with no 2nd line supports. However the Zulus get good dice rolls for movement, steamroller in before the British firepower has time to wear them down. The Zulus get bonuses for charging, possibly rear support and possibly a size advantage. The British get no closing fire, are at a disadvantage for being in skirmish order and have no supports. Pretty much game over with the rules as written. Good deployment and tactics and perhaps a spot of luck for the Zulu, poor choice of tactics from the Brits. Refight it with the Brits deployed in close order and with good mutual support and you might get a very different game.

As a final however, however, I will add, as I always do, that I think games are very personal and that if swapping values around gives you the feel for the game that you want, then go for it. But, I think there are probably other means of achieving the same result within the existing rules - appropriate numbers of Zulus, large Zulu units or small British units, scenario design, hidden deployment and/or movement, use of special rules or modifying command values.

[Cubster]

For fun and without rooting through the bookshelf, a quick Google has brought up -

[From Military Hsitory Online] - Chard describes the pattern that would continue throughout most of the next twelve hours: "A series of desperate assaults were made (by the Zulus)… but each was most splendidly met and repulsed by our men, with the bayonet." (1) The Zulus were extremely wary of British bayonets, and with good reason. Ceaseless hours of bayonet drill had turned the average British infantryman into a most dangerous opponent in hand-to-hand combat, often making him the equal or better of even a well-trained, athletic adversary. Mehlokazulu kaSihayo, a Zulu veteran of Isandlwana, attested to this: "Some Zulus threw assegais at them (British soldiers); but they did not get close – they avoided the bayonet; for any man who went up to stab a soldier was fixed through the throat or stomach and at once fell." (3) This prowess with the bayonet coupled with the effectiveness of their rifle fire accounts for the fact that very few British casualties were caused by edged weapons. Most were caused by Zulu firearms.

[From Deadliest Warrior] - However it still remained important in training, and solider were still highly skilled in it use, a notable example are the British soldier during the Anglo-Zulu war, who used the bayonet so well that even the highly skilled Zulu warriors were hesitant to get close.

Private Hook also refers to the Zulus' 'peculiar aversion to the bayonet' in his account of the battle of Rorke's Drift.

In his various books on the subject Ian Knight also makes reference to the length of the rifle and bayonet, the additional power that can be supplied through the use of both hands to grip it and the short jabbing motions the soldier was drilled to use, which combined to make it a superb defensive weapon that was able to defeat a Zulu armed with ikwla and shield.

[Invisible officer]

The Book Small wars by Colonel Callwell is a contemporay one from late 19th century, a textbook for officers in colonial war service. The later 1906 edition still held the bayonet as a very useful arm for attack against irregular forces. But on p. 399 he stated: "Apart from fanatics and from exeptionally brave savages like the Zulus, irregular warriors, be they Pathan hill-men or Somalis or Boxers or Boers, have no stomach for the infatryman's cols steel." The Zulus are obviously rated as something special.
The 1879 Redcoat was drilled for bayonet fighting like his predecessors in 18th century. Fighting in a line as part of a big machine. Despite all the Zulu regimental organisation the Zulu was still a single fighter.
Movies tend to show a bayonet combat as a big brawl, filling the screen with action. The reality was a hedgehog of bayonet points that acted together.
Isandlwana 1879 went well until the British ran out of ammunition. The distance to the laager and the reserve amo was the problem, not the open formation of companies itself. They blasted away and the gaps in the line had been secured by this fast , but effective, salvoe fire. (The story of the amo boxes opening problem is wrong , it just took to long to get the rounds to the soldiers. )
But with dwindling amo reserves in the soldiers pockets the fire slowed and the Zulus closed. Now the gaps in the line had been the week spot.
Like in the 1745 Jacobite battles the close action specialized enemy broke through the gaps and rolled up the line.

The Martini Henry kicks like a mule and the 1879 rolled brass catridge with strong metal bottom only had it's problems. In a long firefight the barrel gets hot and the ejector tends to rip of the catridge bottom, leaving the brass in the chamber. Fouling by Black powder adds to that effect.

[zedeyejoe]

Apart from fanatics and from exeptionally brave savages like the Zulus, irregular warriors, be they Pathan hill-men or Somalis or Boxers or Boers, have no stomach for the infatryman's cols steel.

Yes thats one of the catch-phrases in Dads Army, "They don't like it up them".

A discussion on the historical use and psychology of the bayonet,
http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/bayonet2.htm

[Invisible officer]

"Statistics from the American Civil War state that over three months of action near Richmond, characterized by above average rates of hand-to-hand combat, casualty ratios for the Union Army were significantly in favour of projectile wounds. While over 32,000 men received treatment for bullet wounds, only thirty-seven were treated for bayonet thrusts. An observer from the same period confirmed that the wounds evident on the dead were in similar proportion. The damage inflicted during "bayonet assault" was most often executed by bullets. "

The author of the website here combined the often cited offical statistic with a subjective statement. That hospital treated men rarely had bayonet wounds is just proof of the deadly effect of bayonet and butt. In furor a man stabs or hits as long as the victim moves. Little left for the doctor. The shooting man shoots and goes on to the next fight with a single loader. (Most ACW soldiers had the Enfield type muzzle loading shot arm, how to load it in hand-to-hand fight? Or a Martini Henry against a Zulu?)

American soldiers had no great liking for the arme blanche. Cavalry without sabres in Indian wars..., European cavalry proofed that the sabre had potential until WW I. And the bayonet had it too under special conditions. Many claimed the pistol to be like the bayonet a useless item for soldiers but in some situations......

With the possibility of a jamming gun some pointed iron might even today be the difference between life and death in a hand-to-hand combat. Low chance, yes. But a better chance than hitting with the plastic butt.

[zedeyejoe]

That hospital treated men rarely had bayonet wounds is just proof of the deadly effect of bayonet and butt. In furor a man stabs or hits as long as the victim moves. Little left for the doctor.

Hence the value of the statement that the wounds on the dead are of similar proportion (0.1%). Hence my view that the bayonet is more of a romantic weapon than one of practical value (but of course the bayonet has been used in recent conflicts and that surprised many).

Shaka had firearms demonstrated to him abut was not impressed

The expanding Zulu power inevitably clashed with European hegemony in the decades after Shaka's death. In fact, European travellers to Shaka's kingdom demonstrated advanced technology such as firearms and writing, but the Zulu monarch was less than convinced. There was no need to record messages, he held, since his messengers stood under penalty of death should they bear inaccurate tidings. As for firearms, Shaka acknowledged their utility as missile weapons after seeing muzzle-loaders demonstrated, but argued that in the time a gunman took to reload, he would be swamped by charging spear-wielding warriors

Perhaps Zulus could have beaten a Napoleonic army?

There are also generals who favoured the bayonet over the bullet. It might be foolish to disagree with Alexander Suvorov

The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a fine chap.

[Cubster]

Isandlwana 1879 went well until the British ran out of ammunition.

I was hoping no-one would throw that old chestnut in. It's done the rounds and is still a question of open debate. Dwindling supply was undoubtably a factor, especially for Durnford's men whose ammunition wagon had yet to arrive at Isandlwana, but the only evidence that the companies of the 24th ran out of ammunition is the fact that when the bodies were discovered, their ammunition pouches were empty. However, the Zulus looted the bodies of anything useful, including ammunition and rifles, before withdrawing ahead of Chelmsford's returning force.

So they may have run out of ammo, they may not have done, it's still one of the many question marks that hang over the battle. Certainly a couple of the retreating companies were isolated, cut off from the camp and ammo wagons and blasted away until they ran out, but the battle was well and truly lost by that stage anyway and the only thing remaining was escape.

[Invisible officer]

Hmm, may be an old nut but for the contemporary officers a very important one and failing Isanldwana amo supply was teached as a how to do not textbook action for decades, true or not.

Remember the reluctance to introduce repeating arms. They said: Higher fire rate cause a high wastage of rounds if there is no good fire discipline. That was the statement all armies followed, the US army introduced post ACW a single loading carbine for the cavalry and not the available repeating, magazine fed, arm. That "new" arm tended to jam in longer fights like the Martini-Henry and was surely no improvement to a Spencer. Some armies later introduced arms with a magazine blockade so that they could be single loaded, the magazine spared for the mad minute. (But not as a bayonet replacement)

In tactical doctrine the direct fire control by the officer was assumed as the most important factor, so soldiers marched into the Boer war in close formation as superb targets. Or Germans 1914 into the muzzles of the British.

That the Bayonet is a romantic weapon is a modern statement few WW I soldiers would follow. Most German's carried an even more "romantic" arm, the Grabendolch, modelled as an arm, not tool. Or the trench raiders club... .Pre automatic arms needed the time to repeat and on close distance that's a deadly problem if your attacker is on you before you have done that.
The German's used Spades , butts and Bayonets in Eastern front engagements surprisingly often still in WW II, jamming SMG and the slow firing K98 caused that, not romantic views. Little wounded from that, only dead.

The average colonial soldier was a regular, not conscripted. He came from a low social background , he was no noble warrior but became a trained killing machine. Prone to drink and fist fighting but in battle under strict discipline. For the irregular warrior he was a hard enemy. A British bayonet line acted as a group and so they had been "better" than the Zulu or Mahdists single "hero" fighter.

[Cubster]

Hmm, may be an old nut but for the contemporary officers a very important one and failing Isanldwana amo supply was teached as a how to do not textbook action for decades, true or not.

Well it's one of those fascinating little nuggets of discussion about Isandlwana that will probably always provide food for differing opinions. There were so many contributory factors and so much happening during the battle, it is tough to try to say 'A' led to 'B' led to 'C', I think the best we can say for certainty is that 'A', 'B' and 'C' happened at some point. Of course, eye witness accounts on both sides are restricted to their own personal experience and none of the 24th Regt company commanders survived.

My own take on it is that, given the situation Chelmsford's actions and hazy standing orders had left everyone in, the companies were spread way too widely over the plain to be able to support each other or retire on the camp (and ammo wagons). I'd say the misguided attempt to reinforce Durnford's troops (who were mounted and frankly should have been executing a fighting wihdrawal) doomed everyone and played straight into the hands of the Zulus who could move at the speed of a cantering horse to separate the various inter-dependent elements of the half column Pulleine had left. They were scattered way too far and although it seems likely that some of the companies kept firing until out of ammo, the majority of the army was dead, fleeing over the river or both by this stage anyway and more bullets would have just delayed the inevitable.

WI online has a review of Ian Knight's new book coincidentally, and I reckon I may have to buy it. He's not shy about contradicting something he wrote in a previous book if he finds new evidence to support a differing view.

[zedeyejoe]

That the Bayonet is a romantic weapon is a modern statement few WW I soldiers would follow.

Perhaps they were just interviewing the wrong soldiers then,

Veterans of the Great War, when interviewed, tended to play down the impact of the bayonet during the war. Many remarked (partly in jest) that the bayonet was used primarily as a splendid means of toasting bread, and for opening cans, to scrape mud off uniforms, poking a trench brazier or even to assist in the preparation of communal latrines.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/weaponry/bayonets.htm

But I do appreciate that bayonets are still being used as a weapon in war,
http://sadefensejournal.com/wp/?p=391