The Battle of Peachtree Creek was fought, considered by some to be the day the Confederacy lost all hope of defending Atlanta and the West. General Joseph Johnston had, up to this point, been fighting a skillful withdrawal against the superior numbers of Sherman's Union Army pressing inexorably forward. Content to withdraw to prearranged strong defensive points, inflict a stinging reposte and withdraw again, his (undoubtably correct) tactics tried the patience of the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, as being too passive. With Union forces pressing ever closer and a counter-attack at Peachtree Creek already planned, Davis was convinced that a more aggressive approach was required and on 17th July the letter arrived to confirm that he had replaced Johnston with the headstrong Lt Gen John Hood, a move deeply criticised by many (Hood included) as being poorly timed at such a vital juncture. There are many occasions throughout history of capable officers in a relatively junior role being promoted beyond their ability ... and this was probably one of them.
The resultant battle three days later between Hood's Army of Tennesse and George Thomas' Army of Cumberland was botched through poor Confederate reconnaissance, poor coordination and poor decision making, by Hood's subordinates and he himself. Hood attacked with his usual aggression, but the whole battle, which was a good opportunity to check or even repulse the Union forces closing in, turned out to be a dismal failure that left the Confederate forces demoralised and severely weakened. Costly frontal assaults were compounded by slow execution and the incorrect channelling of forces to where they were most needed. Men were flooded forward into attacks that had already failed and assaults that could have been successful were starved of the weight of numbers needed. At the end of the day the Union line, whilst pushed back, had never been breached and they had suffered a reported 1,710 casualties compared to almost 4,800 Confederate. The Union Army could well afford to fight an attritional campaign, precisely what the Confederates could not.
Unfortunately, Hood's inability to employ a different approach other than hasty assaults resulted in defeat after defeat and led to the fall of Atlanta six weeks later. A string of failed campaigns with one army after another followed him until the end of the war.